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intersection of market activity and social identity politics. Challenging Boardroom 
Homogeneity draws on semi-structured interviews with corporate board directors in Norway 
and documentary content analysis of corporate securities filings in the United States to 
investigate empirically two distinct regulatory models designed to address diversity in the 
boardroom—quotas and disclosure. 
The author’s study of the Norwegian quota model demonstrates the important role diversity 
can play in enhancing the quality of corporate governance, while also revealing the 
challenges diversity mandates pose. His analysis of the US regime shows how a disclosure 
model has led corporations to establish a vocabulary of “diversity.” At the same time, the 
analysis highlights the downsides of affording firms too much discretion in defining that 
concept. This book thus deepens ongoing policy conversations and offers new insights into 
the role law can play in reshaping the gendered dynamics of corporate governance cultures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: HOMOGENEOUS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CULTURES 
I feel in a couple of situations that were very, very critical, then I saw [the] difference 
between how men and women behave. . . . I’ve seen situations where the women were 
more willing to dig into the difficult questions and to really go to the bottom even if it 
was extremely painful for the rest of the board, but mostly for the CEO . . . when it 
comes to the really difficult situations, [where] you think that the CEO has . . . done 
something criminal . . . [o]r you think that he has done something negligent, something 
that makes it such that you . . . are unsure whether he’s the suitable person to be in the 
driving seat. 
– Interviewee 14
(Norwegian public company board director, woman) 
[I]f . . . a new category of society shall be given power, someone will have to give away 
that power. . . . And that is not an easy thing to do.  
– Interviewee 3
(Norwegian public company board director, woman) 
Berkshire does not have a policy regarding the consideration of diversity in identifying 
nominees for director. In identifying director nominees, the . . . Committee does not 
seek diversity, however defined. 
– Annual proxy statements of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (2010–2013)
The lack of gender parity in corporate boardrooms, and in the governance of economic 
institutions more generally, has ignited a heated global debate. In 2010, the International Monetary 
Fund’s managing director Christine Lagarde (at the time, France’s finance minister) drily quipped that 
the face of the global financial crisis would have had a very different complexion “if Lehman Brothers 
had been ‘Lehman Sisters.’”1 While her comment was viewed favorably in some quarters,2 it elicited 
scathing critique from others; some characterized it as “a kind of lazy, sugar-and-spice gender 
essentialism” and “a tedious slice of benevolent sexism.”3 That same year, members of a French feminist 
direct action group crashed the annual shareholder meeting of the Fortune Global 500 firm Veolia 
Environnement. Sporting faux beards, they sarcastically asked the CEO whether it was “wise to allow 
women to define the strategy of a company, a task requiring intelligence, an ability to react, and 
coolheadedness?”4 At the time, just one of the firm’s seventeen directors was a woman.5  
1
 Christine Lagarde, “Women, Power and the Challenge of the Financial Crisis”, The New York Times (10 May 2010), 
online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/opinion/11iht-edlagarde.html?dbk>. The governance of financial 
institutions is a distinct issue that is not the focus of this book. I use this example only to illustrate the breadth of 
the global conversation and as a springboard for the ensuing discussion of corporate board diversity.  
2
 “In Praise of … Women Bankers”, Editorial, The Guardian (9 October 2013), online: 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/09/women-bankers>. 
3
 Ally Fogg, “Don't Give Me This 'If Lehman Sisters Had Been In Charge …' Nonsense”, The Guardian (17 September 
2013), online:  
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/dont-give-me-lehman-brothers-sisters-nonsense>. 
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Lagarde, and others who have expressed similar sentiments, have contemplated the paucity of 
women in positions of decision-maker power and helped advance a dialogue over whether regulation 
might facilitate equality and improve governance.6 Her comments, like the French feminists’ protests, 
highlight the key issues that inform conversations currently taking place internationally with respect to 
gender representation in corporate governance. Why are some groups well represented in corporate 
leadership positions while others are not? Would increased heterogeneity result in different financial 
outcomes or differences in how firms are managed? And should global regulators intervene with 
corrective measures that attempt to diversify corporate hierarchies, or would this represent an 
unjustified interference with market sovereignty? If intervention is warranted, what form should it take?   
 
  Global statistics indicate that women are noticeably underrepresented on the boards of the 
world’s most significant publicly traded corporations,7 and that country-level progress generally is 
“slow” and “incremental.”8 Regionally, Europe displays the most noteworthy movement toward 
balanced representation levels. North America lags behind Europe (with Canada trailing the United 
States), and Asia (especially Japan and China) remains virtually stagnant.9 Norway, Sweden, and Finland 
exhibit the highest percentages of women in global boardrooms, at 40.9 percent, 27 percent, and 26.8 
percent, respectively. In comparison, the United States sits at 16.9 percent and Canada at 12.1 
percent.10 Figure 1.1 presents the percentage of board seats women hold in forty-four countries from 
Europe, North America, Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Africa, as well as Australia. 
These statistics have recently become the subject of regulatory attention, with states seeking to 
diversify the upper echelons of their corporate sectors by pursuing law-based ameliorative strategies. In 
this book, I evaluate the two primary approaches that states and regulators have adopted to date.11 The 
first consists of board diversity quotas, imposed by legislators, and related target-based initiatives. In 
their most potent form, these measures mandate particular levels of gender balance in the boardroom. 
The second, less interventionist strategy, requires information disclosure. Rather than dictating a 
predetermined outcome, regulators ask corporations to publicly report on diversity-related governance 
practices in varying levels of detail. 
In global policy dialogues, commentators and policymakers invoke different justifications in 
support of these diversification efforts. They frequently present economic rationales, the argument 
being that diversified boards may enhance organizational performance. Also important, though 
frequently overshadowed, are equality-based arguments. These justifications, in turn, engage some of 
                                                          
6
 Lagarde herself has endorsed the use of mandatory quotas in the corporate context. See Leyla Boulton & Andrew 
Hill, “Lagarde Embraces Quotas at FT Conference” The Financial Times (16 November 2010), online:  
<www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a219537c-f1b0-11df-bb5a-00144feab49a.html#axzz2zimxBtYC>. 
7
 My analysis in this book centers on for-profit corporations that issue securities for public distribution and are the 
subject of securities regulation, though I also make reference to state-owned enterprises and privately held 
corporations.   
8
 Kimberly Gladman & Michelle Lamb, “GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards Survey” (April 2013) at 1, online: GMI 




 Catalyst, “2013 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors” (10 December 2013) at 1, online: 
<www.catalyst.org/system/files/2013_catalyst_census_fortune_500_women_board_directors.pdf>; Catalyst, 
“2013 Catalyst Census: Financial Post 500 Women Board Directors” (3 March 2014) at 1, online: 
<www.catalyst.org/system/files/2013_catalyst_census_financial_post_500_women_board_directors.pdf>. 
11
 As noted in chapter 3, these two approaches should not be viewed as alternatives—a number of countries 
contain overlapping regulatory mechanisms. 
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the most fundamental issues of corporate theory. Questions of whether and how the state should seek 
to increase corporate governance diversity are strongly linked to competing conceptions of the 
corporate form. Is the firm’s primary purpose to maximize the wealth of shareholders? Does it also exist 
to promote the general social welfare? While I am primarily concerned with how the regulatory 
mechanisms noted above operate in practice, I also examine their intersection with these underlying 
justifications. Most notably, I critically engage with instrumental, market-based reasoning. I argue that 
state-based intervention is essential to shifting existing norms, but should be based on a combination of 
factors related to organizational governance and decision making and the goals of democratizing power 
and equitably distributing access to opportunities.  
[Insert Figure 1.1 here: Percentage of board seats women hold globally] 
Variance in corporate governance models and the move toward diversity regulation 
The purpose of the corporate board and the board’s relationship with other actors in corporate 
governance systems are not singular. Legal cultures in different jurisdictions envision the board playing 
varied roles. Factors such as the existing shareholder culture, particularly whether it is widely or closely 
held, and the degree to which the law recognizes the role of nonshareholder stakeholders, such as 
employees, creditors, and suppliers, inform the construction of these roles.12 Similarly, boards exhibit 
structural variance. In the dual system, found in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Austria, distinct supervisory and management boards perform the respective roles of overseeing and 
monitoring management and managing the firm’s day-to-day business affairs. In the more common 
unitary system, exemplified by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, a single board 
performs both roles.13 Various jurisdictions afford firms the option to choose between a single- or two-
tiered form,14 and some, including the Nordic states, self-identify as lying “between” these regimes.15  
Significant academic debate abounds on whether the forces of globalization will result in a 
convergence of corporate governance laws and norms toward a single model,16 and in general 
“[c]orporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the world.”17 Board diversity–related reform 
represents an important component of the current dialogue. In all corporate governance cultures, dual 
or unitary, shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented, the reality is that states have now begun tackling the 
difficult questions noted above. And in doing so, momentum is building toward the adoption of law-
                                                          
12
 Paul L Davies & Klaus J Hopt, “Corporate Boards in Europe – Accountability and Convergence” (2013) 61:2 Am J 
Comp L 301 at 302-03. 
13
 Klaus J Hopt, “Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation” in Andreas 
M Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt, eds, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3 at 29-31. 
14
 Ibid at 98. 
15
 See the 2009 joint paper published by the corporate governance agencies of Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Iceland. Danish Corporate Governance Committee et al, “Corporate Governance in the Nordic 
Countries” (April 2009) at 8, online: Iceland Chamber of Commerce <www.vi.is/files/Nordic%20CG%20-
%20web_1472238902.pdf> (“The Nordic corporate governance structure lies between the Anglo-Saxon one-tier 
and the continental European two-tier model.”). 
16
 The proconvergence argument is most notably, and controversially, advanced in Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 439 at 468 (arguing “the triumph” and 
“ideological hegemony” of the Anglo-American shareholder-focused structure).  
17
 Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, “Introduction” in Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds, Convergence and 
Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1 at 1. 
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based or “law like” structures,18 in both common and civil law jurisdictions. While such reform has 
appeared primarily in developed economies, initiatives (or proposed initiatives) in countries such as 
India, Kenya, Malawi, the United Arab Emirates, and South Africa suggest that this trend has reached 
developing economies as well.19  
These developments underscore that the dynamics of international economic activity do not 
exist in isolation, but are integral components of a broader societal landscape.20 In understanding how 
corporations are situated, it is useful to call to mind the intellectual project of Hungarian economic 
historian Karl Polanyi, who shows society and the market to be in a state of “related tension.”21 The 
market is embedded within the society, and in order to protect against the risks that follow self-
interested gain, “market societies must construct elaborate rules and institutional structures.”22 This 
dynamic constitutes Polanyi’s “double movement” thesis: as the negative effects of economic activity 
emerge, protective reactions emanate from society. These reactions resist efforts to decontextualize the 
economy from societal institutions.23 Block discusses these themes by invoking the image of a rubber 
band. Attempts to enhance market sovereignty raise the degree of tension as the band is stretched. As 
this elongation continues, the band will eventually break, resulting in social dissolution, or retract, 
resulting in the market going back to an embedded state.24  
This analytical structure has obvious applicability to debates on globalization, deregulation, and 
the financial crisis. But it is also relevant to corporate governance diversity. According to traditional 
economic theory, the market should eventually address and protect against biases related to socio-
demographic status.25 However, this proposition, to date, has not proven true at the highest levels of 
the corporation. Correspondingly, states have begun to impose regulatory and institutional frameworks 
that constrict unbridled market movements, thereby grounding the market in the “moral fabric of 
society.”26 As noted above and as I further discuss in subsequent chapters, the justifications for these 
                                                          
18
 Davies & Hopt, supra note 12 at 327. See also Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, “Corporate Boards, Incentive 
Pay and Shareholder Activism in Europe: Main Issues and Policy Perspectives” in Massimo Belcredi & Guido 
Ferrarini, eds, Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1 at 28 (“[R]egulation is the single most important factor 
explaining differences in board gender diversity across European countries.”). 
19
 Further details are provided below and in chapters 3 and 7.  
20
 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, “What Does it Mean to Take A Socio-Legal Approach to International Economic Law?” in 
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ed, Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext 
(Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2013) 3 at 9. 
21
 Mark Banks, “Karl Polanyi, The Rubberband Man” (12 December 2008), online: The Open University 
<http://www.open2.net/blogs/society/index.php/2008/12/12/karl-polanyi-the-rubberband-man?blog=10>. 
22
 Fred Block, “Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation” (2003) 32:3 Theory & Soc’y 275 at 297. 
23
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1944) at 76 (“While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe . . .  on the other hand 
a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the 
market. . . . Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system . . .”). 
24
 Fred Block, “Introduction” in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, 2d ed (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2001) at xxv. 
25
 Richard A Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992) at 9 (“Competitive markets with free entry offer better and more certain 
protection against invidious discrimination than any antidiscrimination law.”). 
26
 Jens Beckert, “The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology” in 
Chris Hann & Keith Hart, eds, Market and Society: The Great Transformation Today (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 38 at 41.  
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interventions have not been solely (or even predominantly) predicated on equality-based grounds, but 
the interventions push in that direction nonetheless.  
Roadmap of subsequent chapters  
In this book, I focus on the corporate boardroom as a core location of power in the global 
marketplace.27 I explore the boardroom as a site of contestation over socio-demographic diversity and 
as a place of social closure and social struggle. I consider who has been granted access to the highest 
levels of the corporate hierarchy, and, in recognizing the homogeneity of this site, I explore the 
ameliorative strategies states and regulators employ in an effort to alter the status quo. What shape 
have these initiatives taken and what has been their effect?  
Fundamentally, this is a book about corporate governance—the “system by which companies 
are directed and controlled.”28 Corporate governance has exploded as a subject of reflection in 
scholarly, policy, educational, and practitioner-based circles.29 The degree of attention it attracts has 
only intensified in the wake of the global financial collapse.30 As a field of intellectual inquiry, it is 
remarkably vast, with a wealth of literature from a range of academic traditions addressing the host “of 
legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations can do, who 
controls them, [and] how that control is exercised.”31  
This book is also fundamentally about a set of questions that have received much less attention 
from legal scholars of the corporation: questions involving the social phenomenon of diversity. Diversity 
itself is an amorphous and heavily contested concept.32 Construed expansively, it might encompass the 
full array of groups and persons that compose any given community.33 Sociologists of culture, however, 
identify it as a “keyword”—a linguistic expression that possesses widely acknowledged connotations but 
is also “open to local interpretation” and dependent on context and “the social location of the 
                                                          
27
 “Boardroom – the word alone conjures up visions of power, wealth, and privilege . . .” Jay W Lorsch & Elizabeth 
MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 
1989) at 1. 
28
 Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992) 
at para 2.5. 
29
 Mike Wright et al, “Introduction” in Mike Wright et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013) 1 at 1. 
30
 Hopt, supra note 13 at 5. For a review of the schools of thought on whether corporate governance structures 
and processes were a significant factor in the financial crisis, see William Sun, Jim Stewart & David Pollard, 
“Introduction: Rethinking Corporate Governance – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis” in William Sun, Jim 
Stewart & David Pollard, eds, Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1 at 4-7. 
31
 Margaret M Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995) at 3. 
32
 Joyce M Bell & Douglas Hartmann, “Diversity in Everyday Discourse: The Cultural Ambiguities and Consequences 
of ‘Happy Talk’” (2007) 72:6 Am Soc Rev 895 at 896 (“However defined, the concept of diversity has come under 
heavy scrutiny from public intellectuals.”). 
33
 Faisal Bhabha, “Towards a Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education,” 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ [forthcoming in 2014] 
at 9. 
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 




speaker.”34 As Schuck observes, diversity “means different things to different people” and can “mean 
different things even to the same person at a single point in time.”35  
Because I am concerned with the socio-demographic homogeneity of corporate boards, this 
book focuses primarily on identity-based markers of diversity. In the field of corporate governance, 
international regulatory efforts aimed at diversification have largely involved gender. For that reason, 
much of this book necessarily considers the lack of women in the upper echelons of business 
corporations and the relationship between gender and economic governance.36  
Chapter 2 lays the foundation for understanding recent regulatory innovations in three ways. I 
begin by considering why the international spotlight is focused on boards of directors in particular as 
sites for diversification. With an emphasis on the United States and Canada, I then consider possible 
explanations for existing low levels of representation. I question the narrative of a supply problem that 
often originates from firms and suggest that a more appropriate explanation lies in the coupling of 
implicit cognitive biases with the fact that the networks of existing directors are limited in scope and 
restrict entry. I close by evaluating the rationales for diversification. How has the reform-based 
discourse, to date, justified the push toward increased boardroom heterogeneity? I unpack the 
difficulties of the dominant “business case” for diversity and advocate an approach that centers on 
social equality, as well as on governance effectiveness and decision making, rather than on a 
consequentialist view of shareholder wealth maximization.     
  As noted, regulators have turned to formal remedial measures in an effort to curb the ubiquity 
of male-dominated corporate leadership structures. In chapters 3 through 7 I present and situate the 
core original research of the book, focusing on the two primary modes of legal regulation adopted to 
date. Chapter 3 introduces corporate board quotas. I provide an overview of existing quota and target-
based regimes, teasing out their key characteristics and elucidating how these systems work.  I then turn 
to corporate reporting. In 2009, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a diversity 
disclosure rule that, among other things, asks publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider 
diversity in identifying director nominees. I examine the rule’s details and explore its conceptual 
underpinnings. I also address reactions to the rule and contend that, despite the controversy, the SEC 
did not stray significantly from its mandate when promulgating it. 
Chapter 3 concludes by contextualizing these initiatives within wider bodies of regulatory 
thought.  I present quotas as a form of command-and-control regulation, according to which the 
relationship between the regulator and the regulated is hierarchical and predicated on a deterrence-
based logic.  In contrast, disclosure represents a form of decentered, new governance regulation where 
the state no longer serves as the sole or primary regulator.  Rather, it forms but one part of a pluralistic 
regulatory environment where the regulated entity and other nonstate actors also contribute to the 
formulation of an overall normative ordering.  In the case of quotas, the regulation of corporate 
                                                          
34
 Ellen Berrey, “Bottom-Line Diversity: Race and Productive Pluralism in the Post-Civil Rights Era” (September 
2012) at 27, online: SUNY-Buffalo <www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~eberrey/index_files/Berrey-%20Bottom-
Line%20Diversity-%20Intro,%20Chap%201,%20Chap%205,%20Sept%202012.pdf>. 
35
 Peter H Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2003) at 19. 
36
 In choosing to focus this book on gender diversity at the highest levels of the firm, I acknowledge that I am 
concentrating on a small, privileged group that draws advantage from class differentials. 
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 




governance diversity takes places at the state’s behest; with disclosure, it takes place more in the state’s 
shadow.37  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the quota-based approach in greater depth. Using a qualitative, 
interview-based methodology, I study Norwegian corporate directors’ lived experiences with mandated 
gender balance. The stories of Norwegian board members offer particularly rich sources of insight, given 
that Norway was the first jurisdiction to pursue the quota path and thus has the most mature quota 
regime. Because corporate law does not traditionally concern itself with matters related to identity-
based representation, it is rather striking that Norway’s quota is located not in human rights or equality-
related regulations, but rather in the heart of the legal regime that gives life and personality to 
corporations—Norwegian corporate law. While highly contentious when adopted, the Norwegian quota 
project unquestionably set the stage for subsequent legislative developments in countries such as 
Iceland, Italy, France, and Belgium,38 each of which passed its own quota provision in 2010 or 2011.39  
  
  Fundamentally, boards of directors are social groups. As in any such group, complicated 
relational dynamics inform their interactions. Boards establish behavior-centered practices that they 
believe will facilitate the optimal performance of their duties. They thrive on cohesion. Their established 
norms are easily entrenched and not easily displaced.40 And yet, the spread of diversity quotas has 
accomplished precisely that. The forced repopulation of boards along gender lines has disturbed the 
traditional order of corporate governance systems, dislocating established hierarchies of power and 
privilege in key market-based institutions. Norway represents the paradigmatic case of this disturbance 
and has set in motion a wave of corporate governance reform unlike any other. As such, it constitutes a 
fascinating and appropriate case study through which to consider the implications of quota regimes.  
  Chapters 6 and 7 critically examine the United States’ experiment with diversity disclosure. I rely 
on the United States as a second case study for three principal reasons. First, similar to the Norwegian 
law, the site that houses the US rule is noteworthy. Once again, it is not found in regulation that focuses 
on antidiscrimination, but rather in the center of the legal regime that governs the public issuance of 
shares—US securities law. The US rule has thus been controversial, with some painting it as being 
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of securities regulation. Second, US markets represent the 
biggest share of overall global market capitalization.41 American reform efforts have thus inevitably 
attracted attention and warrant scrutiny. And third, I am mindful of the argument that scholars such as 
Schuck make that there is something special—something unique—about the United States’ recent 
                                                          
37
 The shadow metaphor is recently used to great effect in Marc T Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of 
the State (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2013). 
38
 European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, “Positive Action Measures to Ensure Full 





 Catalyst, “Legislative Board Diversity” (August 2013), online: <http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-board-
diversity#footnote10_7ftls5m>. 
40
 Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, “The Social Nature of Boards” (2005) 70:4 Brook L Rev 1259 at 1265-70. 
41
 See “Top 20 Nations Listed by Stock Market Cap (In Billions)” (25 August 2013), online: Will Banks' Blog - A 
Weblog of Business, Strategy, Politics, Competitive Insights and the Economy  
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/willbanks/2013/08/25/top-20-nations-listed-by-company-market-cap/> (presenting 
compiled World Bank statistics). 
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pursuit of diversity as an affirmative value,42 which makes evaluating its experiment with diversity within 
corporate governance potentially fruitful. In chapter 6, I use a mixed-methods content analysis to 
investigate the US approach. I examine the microdynamics of how corporations have responded to the 
SEC rule during the first four years. The rule does not define “diversity,” leaving it to corporations to give 
this term meaning; firms accordingly have adopted different interpretations. Chapter 7 situates the 
findings within the literature on social norms and the expressive function of law and offers 
recommendations that might serve to strengthen the US approach.  
Chapter 8 concludes by drawing out key lessons from the analysis conducted in the previous 
chapters and then engaging two sets of questions. First, I consider how and to what extent the two 
regulatory models I study should inform the future development of diversity initiatives in North 
American corporate governance. I turn my attention to Canada, where reform is nascent as of this 
writing. Second, I identify future lines of research and inquiry that my case studies suggest. I emphasize 
that the underlying theoretical basis for inclusion must be further developed and augmented with 
equity-based arguments. This work will necessitate continued efforts to connect diversification 
initiatives to contemporary debates regarding corporate theory and to broaden the focus of most 
jurisdictions to include underrepresented socio-demographic groups other than women. Finally, I 
highlight that law offers but one mechanism for reform and that legal authority will act in concert with 
other important extralegal and voluntary dynamics and programs. That said, law will be an integral part 
of achieving diversity, and the legal regulations adopted to serve this end require sustained analysis. 
Methodological approach  
Langevoort notes that the fields of corporate governance and antidiscrimination barely speak 
with one another.43 In attempting to forge such a dialogue, this book’s overall approach and research 
design are decidedly socio-legal. Schmidt and Halliday observe that “[t]he complex arenas of corporate 
law . . . remain ripe for exploration by Law and Society scholars,”44 while Berrey notes that 
“[s]urprisingly few studies have examined empirically how legal ideas of diversity get put to use into 
everyday organizational practices.”45 I am mindful of these observations: while I devote substantial time 
to the black-letter text of quota and disclosure laws, I primarily focus on interrogating the social 
meanings that these laws convey. I explore the legal regulation and discourse surrounding corporate 
board diversity in action and in its institutional and socio-political contexts.46  
I empirically investigate two jurisdictions’ regulatory experiments with boardroom 
diversification, alert to the fact that “[t]he evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.”47 As such, while I do not 
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attempt to provide a direct comparative analysis, I employ a multiple-case research design that 
examines each of the primary approaches jurisdictions have taken to address boardroom homogeneity, 
rather than focusing on one approach over the other.48  
With respect to quotas, in order to understand this form of regulation, I open up the typically 
closed doors of the boardroom. Fanto, Solan, and Darley note that most commentators must resort to 
conjecture about boardroom dynamics, “since boards are an elite, closed environment accessible to few 
persons (and few academics).”49 I therefore break into the “black box”50 of boardroom conduct and 
practice. I delve into the personal experiences of Norwegian directors who gained appointments as a 
result of Norway’s quota law, as well as those who held appointments before the law was enacted.  
Several questions frame my investigation. How have these individuals subjectively experienced, and 
made sense of, this intrusive form of regulation?  How does legally required gender diversity affect their 
economic and institutional lives?  And how has it shaped boardroom cultural dynamics and decision 
making, as well as the overall governance fabric of the board?  
Scholars do not typically use qualitative inquiry in corporate law and corporate governance 
research.51 The preference for an instrumental approach to analyzing corporate dynamics has rendered 
corporate law a sort of “erasing discourse” that considers personal stories inside the corporate form 
immaterial.52 And yet interview-based research, which draws from personal identity narratives, can 
highlight important dynamics in the operation of the corporation. It is only through collecting primary 
data on how the law has translated into the day-to-day existence of directors that we can begin to 
answer the big-picture questions surrounding the viability of positive discrimination in corporate 
governance. As Huse argues, “The missing ingredient in understanding and researching boards of 
directors is the human side of governance.”53  
Exploring these questions will also help us to understand the dynamics of identity politics within 
corporate leadership. The sociologist Puwar explores the realities of marginalized groups who are 
granted access to positions and spaces from which they have traditionally been excluded, referring to 
these groups as “space invaders.” Focusing on the specific site of the UK Parliament, she writes:  
[W]hat happens when those bodies not expected to occupy certain places do so[?] And 
most specifically . . . what happens when women and racialised minorities take up 
‘privileged’ positions which have not been ‘reserved’ for them, for which, they are not, 
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in short, the somatic norm[?] What are the terms of coexistence? This is an encounter 
that causes disruption, necessitates negotiation and invites complicity. Here we have 
the paradox of the increasing proximity of the hitherto outside with the inside proper, 
or, should I say, with the somatic norm. While they now exist on the inside, they still do 
not have an undisputed right to occupy the space.54 
Flowing from this, what has performing the role of “space invader” meant to the women who have 
gained access to the boardroom—a space historically defined by men?55 How have these women 
navigated these gendered corporate borders? Overall, what are the “master narratives,” or dominant 
recurring perceptions, of those who have direct experience with the socio-legal phenomenon at issue?56 
How is gender constructed, reconstructed, and ultimately performed in the boardroom?  
   With regard to disclosure, the data derived from the first four years of the SEC rule provide a 
unique window into the potential meanings of “diversity” in the corporate setting, as well as the limits 
of a strategy that permits corporations to give the term their own definition. Here, I shift my focus from 
the lived experiences of directors to the text of corporate reports. I culled the relevant data from 
corporate disclosure documents, which, to varying degrees, constitute “cultural products”57 that reveal a 
firm’s behaviors, practices, and assumptions.58 They are written presentations of organizational 
identity,59 or “that which is central, enduring, and distinctive about an organization.”60 
Engle Merry writes that “law consists of a complex repertoire of meanings and categories 
understood differently by people depending on their experience with and knowledge of the law.”61 In 
mining these documents, I am interested in learning how firms, in responding to the diversity disclosure 
rule, construct the concept of diversity through their public discourse. What does diversity, viewed 
through the prism of legal regulation, mean to market participants? How do they interpret and 
understand this socio-political idea in the absence of a regulatory definition?  How is it constituted and 
discursively performed, and what vocabularies of diversity have emerged? In other words, I am 
                                                          
54
 Nirmal Puwar, Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2004) at 1. 
55
 Sinikka Pesonen, Janne Tienari & Sinikka Vanhala, “The Boardroom Gender Paradox” (2009) 24:5 Gender Mgmt 
327 at 333 (“We are interested in how women in influential positions ‘do gender’ when they talk about their 
experiences and viewpoints.”). 
56
 John M Conley & Cynthia A Williams, “Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles” 
(2011) 33:4 Law & Pol’y 542 at 557. 
57
 Yvonne Benschop & Hanne E Meihuizen, “Reporting Gender: Representations of Gender in Financial and Social 
Annual Reports” in Iiris Aaltio & Albert J Mills, eds, Gender, Identity and the Culture of Organizations (London: 
Routledge, 2002) 160 at 161 (discussing annual reports, specifically).  
58
 Ibid at 162. Singh and Point provide a similar characterization of diversity statements on corporate websites: 
“They may be viewed as artefacts that reveal information about the corporate culture and play a dynamic role in 
the realisation of values.” See Val Singh & Sébastien Point, “(Re)Presentations of Gender and Ethnicity in Diversity 
Statements on European Company Websites” (2006) 68:4 J Bus Ethics 363 at 363.  
59
 Ibid.  
60
 Dennis A Gioia & Shubha Patvardhan, “Identity as Process and Flow” in Majken Schultz et al, eds, Constructing 
Identity In and Around Organizations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 50 at 50, citing Stuart Albert & 
David Whetten, “Organizational Identity” in Larry L Cummings & Barry M Staw, eds, Research in Organizational 
Behavior, vol 7 (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1985) 263. 
61
 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 5. 
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 




concerned with “[t]he ways people understand and use law[,] . . . their habitual patterns of talk and 
action, and their commonsense understanding of the world.”62  
The Norwegian quota law and the US reporting rule came into effect either through formal 
legislation or regulation. Yet diversity measures, such as international disclosure provisions, are often 
found in so-called soft law mechanisms, including corporate governance codes, guidelines, best practice 
principles, and stock exchange listing rules. While these may not be rooted in “formal” law, they play an 
integral role in influencing corporate action and represent “the changing face of legal regulation in 
globally integrated marketplaces.”63 As such, in referring to “regulatory” or “legal” initiatives and 
measures throughout this book, I take a legal pluralist approach and intend this to refer to both hard 
and soft forms of economic governance. Such an approach appreciates that legal authority stems from a 
range of different social locations.64 Indeed, the reality of contemporary regulatory governance is that 
both forms exert normative influence on firm behavior and, in some cases, are in conversation with one 
another.65 
The findings 
The corporate governance world is in the midst of an important transition. Countries such as 
Norway have adopted bold, potentially transformative initiatives aimed at creating gender balance in 
boardrooms. The United States, by contrast, has taken a less interventionist regulatory approach. But in 
both places, diversity has become an important part of the policy conversation. In these early stages of 
regulation, it remains difficult to predict the full consequences of either approach. While the 
boardroom’s equilibrium has been unsettled, it still carries “the weight of the sedimented past.”66 The 
constitutive borders of diversity-related regulatory governance are still being drawn as regulators 
engage with fundamental questions that implicate both the market and social identity politics. Still, 
much can be learned from this initial period of international regulatory experimentation. 
A. The quota approach 
With its combination of mandated gender balance and severe sanctions for noncompliance in 
the form of forced corporate dissolution, the Norwegian quota model represents the boldest assault on 
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traditional market sovereignty. If we measure progress by the rapid increase in sheer numbers of 
women on boards, Norway unquestionably leads all other jurisdictions.67 
Norway’s achievement, however, does not stem solely from the mere presence of more women 
in its boardrooms. Seen through the eyes of the participants in my study, the particular design of 
Norway’s law appears to have drawn out the substantive benefits that may flow from diversity. The 
dominant narrative my interviewees conveyed was that quota-induced gender diversity has positively 
affected boardroom work and firm governance. Generally, respondents emphasized the range of 
perspectives and experiences that women bring to the boardroom, as well as the value of women’s 
independence and outsider status to the work of the board. They also stressed women’s greater 
propensity to engage in more rigorous deliberations, risk assessment, and monitoring. 
One might expect that feminist principles and thinking would form key motifs in the interviews. 
Rosenblum considers the Norwegian quota law, and quotas more broadly, under the tent of what Halley 
et al. term “governance feminism,”68 or “the installation of . . . feminist ideas in actual legal and 
institutional sites of power.”69 Very few of my interviewees explicitly invoked feminism. But the quota 
law does appear to have had broader social effects by redistributing power in Norwegian society. Many 
respondents discussed how the quota compelled boards and nominating committees to extend their 
searches for new directors beyond the usual, traditional spheres of comfort. Boards had no choice but 
to look outside of their existing networks. This forced action was perceived to be necessary to combat 
the structural inequalities resulting from in-group favoritism and network-based barriers to positions of 
power. 
The presence of a critical mass of women, as required by the quota law, appears to have 
mattered to the achievement of diversity-related outcomes. With a critical mass, women need not 
acclimate to male-dominated corporate governance environments;70 rather, their presence can 
effectuate deeper cultural change. Importantly, in part because of their critical mass, female 
respondents overall reported that they did not feel stigmatized or marginalized as quota beneficiaries 
and that they felt comfortable on their boards. Though their stories are complex, the majority 
characterized the quota as a positive mechanism that had democratized access to a previously 
unavailable space. It seems that the legal imposition of gender balance may thus carry the potential to 
address what Guinier and Torres refer to as “walking backwards up a cheese grater”—the concern that 
breaking into spaces of traditional exclusion may result in the space invader having integral parts of her 
identity shaved away.71 
My results suggest that female directors, present in substantial numbers, may enhance the level 
of cognitive diversity and constructive conflict in the boardroom. They are more apt to critically analyze, 
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test, and challenge received wisdom. In doing so, they appear to have harnessed for their boards the 
value of dissent, a key driver of effective governance.72 That said, the lived reality of the quota law also 
gives rise to a number of interesting and difficult questions for future research and of particular 
relevance to other countries contemplating the adoption of a quota regime. I identify two sets of issues 
that merit further inquiry. First, are there potential costs to the quota model, and will the law continue 
to produce the advantages that have arisen thus far?  For example, do the benefits that directors claim 
women have brought to the boardroom reflect gendered assumptions about women’s behavior?  And 
will some of the benefits of women’s outsider status diminish over time, as women gradually assimilate 
onto boards and into the networks of male directors? Second, can the Norwegian experience be 
translated to other national contexts, and what factors must be taken into account when attempting to 
replicate it? How, for example, do particular features of different countries’ socio-political and corporate 
governance cultures inform the viability of quota legislation?  
B. The disclosure approach 
The SEC’s disclosure rule has caused US corporations to establish a vocabulary of diversity. My 
study shows that “diversity” carries multiple connotations for these firms. My most salient finding, 
however, is that when interpreting this concept in the absence of regulatory guidance, the dominant 
corporate discourse is experiential rather than identity-based. Firms most frequently define diversity 
with reference to a director’s prior experience or other nonidentity-based factors rather than his or her 
socio-demographic characteristics.  
How are we to receive this finding? What are its broader implications? For firms, directors who 
bring a range of experiences to their positions will be attractive candidates who may possess relevant 
knowledge and skills. Candidates with industry experience, for example, may be more likely to grasp 
industry processes and patterns, have knowledge of the competition, be attuned to sources of strategic 
advantage, and have a helpful network of contacts.73 Industry expertise has also been linked to 
meaningful boosts in firm value.74 Further, certain studies that find a positive relationship between firm 
value and board diversity broadly defined suggest that experiential diversity may result in more robust 
positive financial outcomes as compared with socio-demographic diversity.75 Most significantly, unlike 
identity-based characteristics, experience is a predictable, traditional variable that fits within most 
standard conceptions of what it means to be qualified.  
That said, for many observers of the SEC’s rule, including a number of large institutional 
investors, whether the rule will stimulate consideration of socio-demographic representation, and 
eventually increase levels of identity-based diversity on corporate boards, represents a significant 
source of concern. In the future, when the rule has been in effect for a longer period of time, a 
comprehensive study on the causal or correlative relationship between the rule and actual diversity 
levels will be possible in order to evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure as a means of promoting socio-
                                                          
72
 Jeffrey A Sonnenfeld, “What Makes Great Boards Great”, Harvard Business Review 80:9 (September 2002) 106 at 
111 (noting that “the highest-performing companies have extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an 
obligation”). 
73
 Olubunmi Faleye, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash, “Industry Expertise on Corporate Boards” (5 July 2013) at 1, 
online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117104>.  
74
 Ibid at 35. See also Wolfgang Drobetz et al, “Is Director Industry Experience a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism?” (16 January 2014) at 46, online: SSRN 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256477> (“we document a robust positive association 
between industry experience of corporate directors and firm value.”). 
75
 Ronald C Anderson et al, “The Economics of Director Heterogeneity” (2011) 40:1 Fin Mgmt 5 at 27.  
Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 




demographic diversity.76 In the meantime, my study’s preliminary finding—that, to date, other factors in 
the disclosures overshadow social identity categories—serves as an initial caution that the SEC rule as 
currently formulated may not produce diversity-enhancing results along socio-demographic lines. I 
argue that the rule can be expected to produce meaningful socio-demographic results only if corporate 
governance cultures internalize diversity as a social norm. Since that has not yet occurred, the results of 
my content analysis can be expected to replicate themselves going forward in the absence of some sort 
of change.  
That said, I posit that the rule, if redesigned, would have greater potential than it does now to 
alter existing norms and therefore to possibly modify behavior. Officially, the SEC disavows any desire to 
affect firms’ conduct or to encourage any particular type of diversity. As I explain, however, I believe this 
claim should be viewed with skepticism. I recommend revisiting the rule’s underlying architecture and 
offer two recommendations that may improve its effectiveness: providing normative content for the 
term “diversity,” and moving to a “comply-or-explain” disclosure design buttressed by targeted reviews 
of issuers’ diversity filings. 
Disclosure is attractive as a regulatory tool to the extent that it moves important issues into the 
light and catalyzes a process of internal self-reflection on the part of the reporting party that can prompt 
behavioral change. If well designed, a disclosure regime may yield important benefits. But its use may 
also be called into question if it allows the regulated entity too much discretion in defining a core 
feature of the regime.  
Real world policy implications 
  I am cognizant of the dynamism of diversity-related corporate governance reform. At the time 
of this writing, policymakers around the world are debating what, if any, regulatory paths to pursue to 
facilitate boardroom heterogeneity.  
Quotas and related target-based provisions for publicly traded firms are currently at different 
stages of consideration in Canada,77 the EU,78 Germany,79 Scotland,80 South Africa,81 and the United Arab 
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Emirates.82 The same is true for government-owned enterprises in Brazil83 and the Philippines.84 Other 
states have signalled that they may resort to positive discrimination in the future, as a measure of last 
resort. The UK government, for example, opposes quotas. After a 2013 report indicated that female 
appointments to FTSE 100 boards had slowed, however, UK Business Secretary Vince Cable cautioned 
firms that it may become increasingly difficult for the government to adhere to its voluntary plan and 
that the shadow of quotas looms large over the market.85 Similarly, the Swedish minister of finance 
recently expressed frustration with the slow pace of voluntary corporate action and stated that Sweden 
may “gradually move towards being forced to launch quota legislation” in the near future if the situation 
does not improve.86 
New disclosure provisions are presently the subject of regulatory conversation in the European 
Union and in Canada. In addition, some jurisdictions with reporting measures already in place are 
currently reevaluating their efforts and contemplating reform. In 2012, Singapore updated its Code of 
Corporate Governance to include a diversity disclosure provision.87 In 2013, a joint industry-government 
Diversity Task Force took shape to study gender representation in the governance structures of 
Singaporean companies and make recommendations to both the corporate sector and government.88 
Similarly, the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority has recently put under the microscope that country’s 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practices. While the Guidelines have contained a diversity element 
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for quite some time,89 the regulator is considering stronger measures to combat the “lethargy in 
appointing women to . . . boards.”90  
As the debate continues and evolves, it is my hope that the original research I present here will 
inform ongoing international policy discussions and deepen our understanding of the complexities 
associated with corporate governance diversification. Though my analyses are suggestive, rather than 
conclusive, they offer valuable insights into the role of law in reshaping the gendered fabric of corporate 
governance cultures and thereby advance socio-legal discourse on the contemporary business 
corporation. Of course, the experiences of my two case studies may not be easily transferred to other 
jurisdictions. In contemplating regulatory design, no one-size-fits-all solution will be available to achieve 
desired outcomes. Much depends on a complex web of interactions between a given jurisdiction’s socio-
political culture, its corporate governance culture, and industry- and firm-particular characteristics. That 
said, important points of commonality can be discovered, and valuable lessons can be learned, from 
peering outside of sovereign borders.91 The case studies I present here provide insights that concretize 
some of the most salient issues under debate around the world. In-depth consideration of these 
experiences will help policymakers and scholars determine what regulatory measures can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish and assess the factors that inform the success or failure of different approaches 
to a crucial set of social and political debates.  
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